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ARTICLES
PRIVATIZATION - THE UNITED
KINGDOM EXPERIENCE
Cosmo Graham*
The business of government is not the government of business.
- Nigel Lawson
I have been asked to try and explain why the privatization
program in Britain took the shape that it did. In order to do
this, I need to spend some time explaining the legal and politi-
cal context within which privatization in Britain was undertak-
en. In so doing, we will see that there are certain factors,
unique to Britain, which are not replicable in other countries.
This raises the question of what lessons can be learned from
the British experience.
I. THE LEGAL CONTEXT
Britain may well be unique in having an unwritten consti-
tution. This does not mean that there is no constitution. It
simply means that there is no one constitutional document,
and that our constitution is a mixture of legislation, case law,
conventions and informal practices. The foundation stone of
this structure is the principle of Parliamentary sovereignty,
famously enunciated by Professor Dicey:
The principle of Parliamentary sovereignty means neither
more nor less than this, namely, that Parliament thus de-
fined has, under the English constitution, the right to make
or unmake any law whatever; and, further, that no person or
body is recognized by the law of England as having a right to
* H. K. Bevan Professor of Law, Law School, University of Hull, United
Kingdom.
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override or set aside the legislation of Parliament.1
Following from this principle, the orthodox position is that
the courts are not permitted to review the legality of primary
legislation. Parliament may make any law on any subject. This
lack of an ability to review legislation on constitutional
grounds is not unique to Britain, the position is the same in
France2 and the Netherlands.3 However, such an absence is
more problematic in the context of the British Parliamentary
system.
When Albert Dicey refers to Parliament, he means the
House of Commons, House of Lords and the Sovereign. When
he first wrote the words in 1885, the House of Lords could still
block proposed legislation ana the Royal Assent was perhaps
not entirely a formality. Although the party system in the
House of Commons was beginning to take its modern form, it
was still possible to see Members of Parliament as indepen-
dently minded. It has been one hundred or so years since the
Parliament Acts of 1911 and 1949 were passed, which have
reduced the House of Lords' power to that of delay only, and
the assent of the sovereign has become a formality. The House
of Commons has become dominated by the modern party sys-
tem whereby Members of Parliament are expected to support
the party line without exception. The result is that the House
of Commons is commanded by the majority party, which forms
the government. With a majority, the government is able to
pass whatever legislation it wishes so the legislature becomes,
in effect, the tool of the executive. The only time that there is a
problem is when the proposed legislation divides the governing
party, as was the case recently over the ratification of the
Maastricht Treaty.4 There are limited opportunities for the
1. ALBERT V. DICEY, THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 39-40 (10th ed. 1959).
2. See JOHN BELL, FRENCH CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 (1992). However, Bell
notes that while France has always been a fervent believer in parliamentary su-
premacy, this supremacy has come to be understood in a new way with limited
powers of constitutional review being placed in the Conseil Constitutionnel. Id. As
Bell explains, "[t]he new boundaries of Parliament's powers are policed by the
Conseil constitutionnel, a body that is best seen as a form of constitutional court."
Id.
3. See GRONDWET [Constitution] art. 120 (Netherlands).
4. See generally Richard Rawlings, Legal Politics: The United Kingdom and
Ratification of the Treaty on European Union (Part One), 1994 PUB. L. 254; Rich-
ard Rawlings, Legal Politics: The United Kingdom and Ratification of the Treaty
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use of procedural tactics to delay or halt legislation. Filibuster-
ing is impossible because the government can introduce a guil-
lotine, as it did with the bill introduced to privatize British
Telecom (BT), and the government always has a majority on
the relevant committees.
The result of this system is that legal constraints on the
government's privatization program have been minimal. The
courts have only been involved at the fringes of the program,
on largely technical issues.5 Other ex post facto scrutiny has
been limited to committees of the House of Commons, of which
the most important has been the Public Accounts Committee.
This Committee only has been concerned with the question of
whether the government received a fair price for the assets
sold; it has not sought, or been entitled to, question the wider
policy aspects of the program.6 Major criticism from within the
Parliamentary system has also come from the Select Commit-
tee on Energy of the House of Commons which issued a variety
of highly critical reports on the arrangements for privatization,
at both pre and post-legislative stages, without questioning the
basic principle of privatization.7 There was, and still is, no
equivalent Select Committee for telecommunications and water
and so there has been little sustained Parliamentary scrutiny
of these areas. In any event, with the abolition of the Depart-
ment of Energy after the 1992 general election, the Energy
Select Committee was wound up and its functions were trans-
ferred to the Select Committee on Trade and Industry, which
is currently spending substantial time on utilities matters.
on European Union (Part Two), 1994 PUB. L. 367.
5. See, e.g., Ross v. Lord Advocate, [1986] 3 All E.R. 79 (whether the assets
of the Trustee Savings Bank were owned by the state); Institution of Professional
Civil Servants v. Secretary of State for Defence, [1987] 3 C.M.L.R. 35 (consultation
with the workforce on the Transfer of the Undertakings Regulations); Sheffield
City Council v. Yorkshire Water Services Ltd., [19911 2 All E.R. 280 (transfer of
assets of old water authorities).
6. On the work of the Public Accounts Committee, see COSMO GRAHAM &
TONY PROSSER, PRIVATIZING PUBLIC ENTERPRISES 60-61, 93-95 (1991); J.F.
McEldowney, The National Audit Office and Privatisation, 54 MOD. L. REV. 933
(1991).
7. See, e.g., HOUSE OF COMMONS, FIRST REPORT FROM THE ENERGY COMM.,
REGULATION OF THE GAS INDUSTRY, H.C. Doc. No. 15, 1985-1986 SESS. (1986);
HOUSE OF COMMONS, THIRD REPORT FROM THE ENERGY COMM., THE STRUCTURE,
REGULATION AND ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF THE ELECTRICITY SUPPLY IN THE
PRIVATE SECTOR, H.C. Doc. No. 307-i, 1987-1988 SESS. (1988).
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The one area where important legal restraints do exist is
in the area of European Union law. In this area, if there is a
clash of law between Union and domestic law, it is firmly es-
tablished, at least in the mind of the European Court of Jus-
tice, that Union law will prevail over domestic law.8 For all
practical purposes so far, British judges have accepted that
this is also the position in English law.? The Treaty of Rome is
neutral regarding property ownership, whether property is to
be publicly or privately owned is a matter for the member
state. ° The Treaty does, however, contain rules that have
affected the British privatization program. Article 92 contains
a general prohibition of state aids to industry, with a limited
range of exceptions which have to be approved by the Commis-
sion of the European Community. Articles 85 and 86 contain
rules about agreements, cartels and abuse of dominant posi-
tions which are relevant to monopoly enterprises whether
public or private. In addition, there are various rules contained
in Union "secondary" legislation which have the potential to
affect the privatization process. Of these provisions, it has been
Article 92 which has had the most highly publicized effects on
the privatization process. The general consequence has been,
not to halt the privatization process or change the structure of
privatization, but to limit the government's discretion to offer
incentives to prospective buyers of privatized companies. Thus,
for example, after the sale of the Rover Group to British Aero-
space the Commission demanded a £331 million cut of the cash
injection into Rover and, after a second investigation, demand-
ed that British Aerospace repay some £44.4 million of the pur-
chase price."
To summarize this section, there have been few legal con-
straints placed on the British government's privatization pro-
gram. To explain the shape that the program took, we must
8. Case 6/64, Costa v ENEL, 1964 E.C.R. 585, [1964] 3 C.M.L.R. 1.
9. Regina v. Secretary of State for Transport (No. 2), 1 App. Cas. 603 (H.L.
1991).
10. THE TREATY OF ROME CONSOLIDATED AND THE TREATY OF MAASTRICHT 711
(Neville M. Hunnings & Joe M. Hill eds., 1992) (Article 222).
11. For details of this and other interventions of the Commission, see GRAHAM
& PROSSER, supra note 6, at 126-29. The second decision of the European Commis-
sion was subsequently annulled by the European Court of Justice on procedural
grounds. See Case C-292190, British Aerospace plc v. Commission, 1992 E.C.R. 493,
[1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 853.
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look to the political and pragmatic constraints faced by the
government.
II. THE POLITICAL CONTEXT
The Conservative government which took office in 1979
was, at least ostensibly, committed to radically different poli-
cies from that of the Labour government. There is fierce debate
in the political science literature over the extent to which
"Thatcherism" (to use what became a convenient shorthand for
the policies of the Conservative government) had a coherent
program and the extent to which its policies were developed
pragmatically, in an incremental and opportunistic fashion. 2
The privatization policy is a very good example of this ambigu-
ity. The Ridley report that was leaked before the election con-
tained a program for dealing with the unions but had only a
small place for privatization." The 1978 manifesto referred
only to the sale of shares in the National Freight Corporation,
sale of the recently nationalized aerospace and shipbuilding
industries and of the National Enterprise Board's holdings, a
"complete review" of the British National Oil Corporation's
activities and relaxation of bus licensing. The early
privatizations were modest, concentrating on companies in
competitive sectors. Yet from these modest beginnings the
program has grown to encompass the major public utilities of
telecommunications, gas, electricity and water as well as the
railways and the "ultimate privatization," that of the coal in-
dustry. How then did the program gain momentum, to the
point of becoming one of the centerpieces of the Conservative
party's strategy?
Feigenbaum and Henig have produced a useful typology of
the political motivations underlying privatization initiatives. 4
They distinguish between pragmatic, tactical, and systemic
privatization strategies. Pragmatic privatization strategies
12. See, e.g. ANDREW GAMBLE, THE FREE ECONOMY AND THE STRONG STATE:
THE POLITICS OF THATCHERISM (1988); DENNIS KAVANAGH, THATCHERISM AND BRIT-
ISH POLITICS: THE END OF CONSENSUS? (1987); PETER RIDDELL, THE THATCHER
GOVERNMENT (1985); THATCHERISM (Robert Skidelsky ed., 1988).
13. See Mariusz M. Dobek, Privatization as a Political Priority: The British
Experience, 41 POL. STUD. 24, 36-37 (1993).
14. Harvey B. Feigenbaum & Jeffrey R. Henig, The Political Underpinnings of
Privatization, 46 WORLD POL. 185 (1994).
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take place where the key actors view privatization as one
among several alternative "tools" for solving societal prob-
lems.15 "Tactical privatizations... are advocated to achieve
the short term political goals of particular parties, politicians,
or interest groups." 6 "Systemic privatization strategies...
are intended to reshape the entire society by fundamentally
altering economic and political institutions and transforming
economic and political interests."17 My contention in this pa-
per is that, from the point of view of the Conservative party,
privatization has been in practice, largely a tactical matter. At
the same time, however, it offered a pragmatic solution to the
seemingly insoluable problems presented by public enterprises
which made it attractive to the civil servants involved. The
resulting scale of the program, combined with other changes
brought about by Conservative governments, have, in the end,
brought about important systemic changes.
There are two important background factors to bear in
mind when assessing the development of the privatization
program. First, an important faction of the Conservative party,
including then-Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, converted
to neoliberal ideas. Without going into any great detail on the
content of neoliberal beliefs, the important point is that im-
portant sections of the Conservative party believed in market
mechanisms rather than state centered allocative mechanisms.
Thus, this wing of the party saw privatization as a natural
policy." The second factor was the overall economic context
and, in particular, the strategies adopted by the Conservatives
for dealing with the economy. In the late 1970s and early
1980s, Britain was in a severe economic crisis. The favored
solution was to cut back on public expenditure which formed
the centerpiece of the Conservative government's policies. The
major measure of public expenditure was the Public Sector
Borrowing Requirement (PSBR). Borrowing by nationalized
industries was part of this measure, but due to Treasury ac-
counting rules, the sale of nationalized industries helped to
15. Id. at 191-92.
16. Id. at 192.
17. Id.
18. See NIGEL LAWSON, THE VIEW FROM No. 11: BRITAIN'S LONGEST-SERVING
CABINET MEMBER RECALLS THE TRIUMPHS AND DISAPPOINTMENTS OF THE THATCHER
ERA 199 (1992).
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reduce the PSBR.
We must also remember that the nationalized industries
were, in themselves, an important policy problem. The struc-
ture created for their operation had brought about neither
clear commitment to social goals nor great economic efficiency.
They were bedevilled by short term political interventions
which hit, in particular, their capital expenditure. 9 Conse-
quently, by the 1980s, a number of the industries, notably
telecommunications and water, were in need of substantial
capital injections, which would not be forthcoming from the
public sector. There were attempts within government to pro-
duce reforms of nationalized industries but, for one reason or
another, they were all dismissed as unworkable."
How does this account, which emphasizes the key role of
economic problems, square with the publicly admitted objec-
tives of the policy? The problem is nicely put by Abromeit:
[The system of aims] was not formulated at the beginning of
the policy of privatization: we search in vain for official gov-
ernment pronouncements-e.g. a White Paper-from the early
years which comprehensively present and adequately clarify
the aims and scope of the proposed measures. Only in recent
times, after this policy has steadily expanded by a sort of
dynamic of its own, have government members, in particular
John Moore, made it their business in various speeches to
equip the de facto policy, after the event, with a more or less
consistent philosophy.21
Most of the commentators agree and they produce fairly simi-
lar lists of objectives of which Vickers and Yarrow's is a fair
example. They list seven aims: reducing government involve-
ment in industry, improving efficiency in the privatized indus-
tries, reducing the PSBR, easing problems in public sector pay
determination, widening share ownership, encouraging employ-
ee share ownership and gaining political advantage.22 These
19. See generally TONY PROSSER, NATIONALISED INDUSTRIES AND PUBLIC CON-
TROL: LEGAL, CONSTITUTIONAL AND POLITICAL ISSUES (1986).
20. For details of these ideas, which were never made publically available, see
LAWSON, supra note 18, at 204-05. See also DENNIS SWANN, THE RETREAT OF THE
STATE 236-37 (1988).
21. Heidrun Abromeit, British Privatization Policy, 41 PARLIAMENTARY AFF. 68,
72 (1988).
22. JOHN VICKERS & GEORGE YARROW, PRIVATISATION: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
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are not all compatible. For example, improving efficiency sug-
gests increasing competition while reducing the PSBR means
maximizing the sale price of an industry. If competition in the
industry is increased, then the sale price is likely to be re-
duced.
What I shall do in the remainder of this paper is to take
certain of these claims and see whether or not the resulting
arrangements meet these objectives. I am going to look at
three: increasing share ownership, improving efficiency
through increasing competition and improving efficiency and
accountability through better arrangements for regulation.
I
III. INCREASING SHARE OWNERSHIP
The claim here is that increasing share ownership would
produce a new means of accountability for the industries. John
Moore put the arguments nicely:
[Tihe extraordinary success that privatization now has in
creating a wide distribution of shares produces shareholder
pressures quite unlike those faced by nationalized industries
or conventional companies. The existence of large numbers of
shareholders who have both paid for their shares expecting a
reasonable return and are customers interested in good ser-
vice at a fair price is an irresistible combination and a power-
ful lobby in'favor of both efficiency and price restraint.
23
What he seems to have in mind is accountability to the share-
holders through company law techniques, e.g., the general
meeting. Additionally, the market for corporate control should
not be ignored, even though this is not a politically attractive
point.
IV. ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE GENERAL MEETING
The first point to notice is that the number of shareholders
in the privatized industries has dropped dramatically and rap-
idly after flotation. Even in BT, the number of small share-
157 (1988). See also SWANN, supra note 20, at 228-38; CENTO VELJANOVSKI, SELL-
ING THE STATE 7-10 (1987).
23. John Moore, The Success of Privatisation, in PRIVATISATION AND REGULA-
TION 94, 95 (John Kay et al. eds., 1986).
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holders dropped from 2.1 million on flotation to 1.4 million;'
only 24% of shares not held by government or employees were
clearly in the hands of individual shareholders. British Air-
ways lost over 750,000 shareholders in the seven months after
flotation.25 In British Airports Authority (BAA), the number of
shareholders dropped from 2.2 million to under 1.3 million in
three months. Since 1979, despite the privatization program,
the dominance of institutional over personal investors on the
UK Stock Exchange has increased. However, after a decade of
privatization, the number of shareholders in the population
has almost tripled and there is evidence that shareholders are
more likely to vote for the Conservative, rather than the
Labour Party. That the Conservatives were aware of this is
perhaps illustrated by the fact that before the 1987 general
election, the Party Chairman wrote to shareholders in BT who
lived in constituencies with a Labour Members of Parliament
warning them of the effect of the latter's policies on national-
ization.
The second point is that the information flow to sharehold-
ers is deficient. For example, it has been claimed that British
Gas' Annual Report actually contains less commercial informa-
tion then it did when it was a nationalized industry.2 This
situation has deteriorated because the Companies Act of 1989
introduced new rules which allow listed public companies to
provide shareholders with an abbreviated version of their re-
ports and accounts;29 an option which has been taken up by
some of the privatized companies, such as BT. This followed,
according to reports, an argument by the Trustee Savings
Bank ("TSB"), backed up by other privatized companies, that
sending the full report was wasteful, as it just ended up in the
bin. ° It should be added that problems about annual reports
is not something peculiar to privatized companies. The Scottish
24. Big Fish Grab Sell Off Shares, LAB. RES., Sept. 1987, at 7, 8.
25. Id. at 7.
26. Lynton Mclain, Traffic Rise Helps BAA to £136m, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 25,
1987, at 24.
27. For the figures and survey evidence, see Dobek, supra note 13, at 23-24.
28. Nick Bunker, TSB Shareholders' Fury Falls to Stop Bid for Bank, FIN.
TIMES, Nov. 3, 1987, at 1.
29. Companies Act, 1985, ch. 6, § 251 (Eng.).
30. Richard Waters, Fears of What Lurks Below the Bottom Line, FIN. TIMES,
April 7, 1988, at 7.
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Chartered Accountants published a report criticizing the type
of information supplied in company annual reports and making
suggestions to improve the situation.3'
Finally, reports of the annual general meetirigs (AGMs) of
privatized industries indicate that, with the possible exception
of the first BT AGM, proper scrutiny of directorial performance
is non-existent. The general attitude of the privatized compa-
nies appears to be that ascribed by The Economist to BT: "BT's
attitude, sadly, is that it has a statutory obligation to hold an
AGM and that the shareholders are there under sufferance."32
Whenever shareholders have attempted to raise controversial
issues, they have easily been out-maneuvered. For example, at
one AGM of the TSB there was violent opposition to the pro-
posed take-over of the merchant bank Hill Samuel from the
small shareholders. Their challenge was unsuccessful, in part
because the motion of no confidence was reported to be con-
trary to the articles of association. The episode illustrates that
when it comes to controlling meetings, the incumbent manage-
ment holds all the cards. The shareholders did not give up, and
a committee of some 20 private shareholders was formed to
coordinate criticism of the TSB's acquisition policy.3 Another
good example was BREL, where the campaign to save 1,200
jobs by cancelling a four million pound shareholders dividend
and investing the money in the company failed at the AGM
when the Chairman revealed that he held 85% of the votes in
proxy form. 4
Equally instructive has been the response of the British
Gas board to challenges to retiring directors. At the first AGM
after privatization, the industrial consumers (whose complaints
about British Gas's pricing policy have led to a Monopolies and
Mergers Commission (MMC) probe and consequent policy
changes) attempted to have Ian Macgregor appointed to the
board as a representative of their interests. This was easily
31. MAKING CORPORATE REPORTS VALUABLE: A DISCUSSION DOCUMENT BY THE
RESEARCH COMMITTEE OF THE INSTITUTE OF CHARTERED ACCOUNTANTS OF SCOT-
LAND (Peter N. McMonnies ed., 1988). See also TERRY SMITH, ACCOUNTING FOR
GROWNTH: STRIPPING THE CAMOUFLAGE FROM COMPANY ACCOUNTS (1992).
32. British Telecom Has a Thing or Two to Learn From Ma Bell, ECONOMIST,
Sept. 7, 1985, at 91.
33. Bunker, supra note 28, at 1; TSB Board Faces Stormy AGM, OBSERVER,
Jan. 31, 1988, at 6.
34. RAIL, April 3-16, 1991, at 20.
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defeated in, as one commentator put it, "a near-unanimous
card vote reminiscent of the back parking lot at Cowley." In
1988, Noel Falconer put himself forward as a representative of
the small shareholders. This was also unsuccessful and the
board of British Gas have now made it more difficult to chal-
lenge incumbent directors by putting forward a resolution
which deleted Article 92(3) of the articles of association, which
obliged British Gas to end shareholders advance notice of any
challenge to incumbent directors.35
There are, however, recent signs that perhaps the regional
companies are becoming more responsive to shareholder pres-
sure. As part of a broader campaign against certain policies of
Yorkshire Water, a consumer group bought shares in the com-
pany and nominated Diana Scott, who had been the Chair of
the Customer Services Committee, for the board of directors.
This nomination was opposed by the board and at an acrimoni-
ous general meeting, she was defeated on a poll vote having
obtained the support of some of the local authority pension
funds.36 Subsequently, it seems that the company has
changed its position, conceding the need for a broader spread
of non-executive directors and making concessions on certain
issues of concern to consumers, notably water metering.
If the shareholders generally are ineffective, what about
the institutional investors? Reliable empirical evidence is very
sparse but it seems to indicate that institutions rarely inter-
vene in management matters, and that they will not do so in
the public forum of the AGM. This is not the sort of sharehold-
er accountability the government would wish to be seen pro-
moting. None of this is particularly surprising nor peculiar to
the privatized industries. As one commentator put it, "[a]
system designed in the 19th century when the whole quoted
company mechanism was developed cannot cope with mass
capitalism."" All of which goes to show that perhaps we
ought to look for the real restraints in the market for corporate
35. Simon Rose, British Gas Faces Another Small Shareholder Bid, INDEPEN-
DENT, July 1, 1990, (Business), at 17.
36. For details of the defeat, see Simon Davies, Watchdog Fails to Join
Yorkshire Water Board, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 30, 1994, at 22.
37. See, e.g., Burton's Problems Are Not, On Present Evidence, Really Tailor-
Made to the Guiness Pattern, GUARDIAN, Jan. 13, 1988, at 30.
38. Hamish McRae, Annual Meetings Do Not Work - We Need Another Way,
GuARDIAN, Aug. 17, 1988., at 7.
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control.
V. GOLDEN SHARES
The market for corporate control in Great Britain is not,
by any means, the classic free market. In reality it is a highly
politicized, discretionary market where takeover bids are over-
seen by a complicated network of regulatory institutions."
With privatized industries there is an additional complication -
the existence of "golden shares". A colleague and I have dealt
with the legal provisions in detail elsewhere" and so the dis-
cussion here will be somewhat schematic.
The basis, in general, for a golden share scheme is that
the share capital of the company will contain one special rights
redeemable preference share of £1 held by the government or
their nominee. Certain matters are then specified as being
deemed to be a variation of the rights of the Special Share and
can, therefore, only be effective with the consent in writing of
the Special Shareholder. The most common of these matters
are: any amendments to the article relating to the Special
Share, the article defining the restrictions on shareholding and
the definitions of various terms. A prohibition on a voluntary
winding-up and on the creation of new shares, other than ordi-
nary equity shares, is usually included.41 One provision worth
mentioning in greater detail is that in four cases (Amersham
International, Cable and Wireless, Jaguar and Rolls-Royce) the
disposal of a material part of the assets of the company, de-
fined as 25%, is deemed to be a variation of the rights of the
Special Shareholder.42 In these cases, even a substantial re-
39. See generally Paul Craig, The Monopolies and Mergers Commission: Com-
petition and Administrative Rationality, in REGULATION AND PUBLIC LAW 201 (Rob-
ert Baldwin & Christopher McCrudden eds., 1987); Maurice Wright, City Rules
O.K? Policy Community, Policy Networks and Takeover Bids, 66 PUB. ADMIN. 389
(1988).
40. Cosmo Graham & Tony Prosser, Golden Shares: Industrial Policy by
Stealth?, 1988 PUB. L. 413.
41. Sometimes, the creation of non-equity shares is allowed which, when ag-
gregated with all other such shares, carry the right to cast less than 15% of the
votes capable of being cast on a poll at any general meeting.
42. The Articles of British Airports Authority make the disposal of airports a
variation of class rights and thus subject to the consent of the special shareholder.
The Articles of Rolls-Royce also make specific provision for the protection of its
nuclear business, i.e., the development, manufacture and sale of nuclear propulsion
units and nuclear cores for submarines.
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structuring of the company will depend on negotiations be-
tween it and the government, rather than the free play of
market forces.
On these foundations, two different types of schemes are
identifiable. The first was peculiar to Britoil and Enterprise
Oil. The basic idea was that if any person controls, or makes
an offer for, more than 50% of the voting rights, then the spe-
cial shareholder will have one more vote at a general meeting
than all the other shareholders. The second scheme has been
used in the other privatizations and the usual reference to
'golden' shares is rather misleading. The only function of the
special share is to entrench certain provisions about the limita-
tions on shareholding which are then operated by the directors.
It is quite possible to have such limitations without a special
preference share, as is the case for British Airways and the
TSB. The essence of this scheme is that if a person owns over
15% of the shares, then he/she is compulsorily divested of
them, the shares are sold to other parties and the persons so
divested receive the proceeds. While the procedure is being
carried out, the person's voting rights are removed.
These are draconian and wide-ranging powers without
parallel in conventional company law. The previous cases on
the alteration of articles have all dealt with attempts to alter
the articles in order to deprive a particular person of their
shares. No matter what one's interpretation of this line of
cases, it cannot be stretched to encompass a general ban in-
cluded in the original articles. Nor can it be interpreted to
challenge the directors. Their decisions are carefully insulated
from challenge, and they are mandatory. The possibility of
challenging the valuation is also highly unlikely.43
There has been little public discussion by the government
of the rationale, in general, for golden share schemes, just
occasional justifications for specific schemes. Nigel Lawson has
claimed parentage and that their object was to prevent compa-
nies falling into foreign hands, although this could not be stat-
43. For a discussion of this line of cases, see F. G. Rixon, Competing Interests
and Conflicting Principles: An Examination of the Power of Alteration of Articles of
Association, 49 MOD. L. REV. 446 (1986). Given that the privatized companies are
all listed on the Stock Exchange, the problems that arise in valuing shares in
private companies do not exist here.
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ed explicitly because of European Union law.44 There appears
to be some uncertainty about when they are appropriate and
how long they should last. It is difficult, for example, to think
of convincing reasons why BT should have a golden share but
not British Petroleum. Equally, it is not clear why the pro-
posed golden shares for the English water authorities should
be given a five year time limit whereas the golden share pro-
posed for Welsh Water will be permanent, unless 75% of the
shareholders agree otherwise.4"
This apparent confusion would be less important if golden
shares were only a presentational device, which were unlikely
to be utilized. Experience, however, has shown otherwise. The
most highly publicized example has been the takeover of
Britoil by British Petroleum.46 The salient point here is that
the government, after much hesitation and confusion, used the
golden share to negotiate with British Petroleum and extract
certain concessions from it about the takeover. These includ-
ed, inter alia, undertakings that employee numbers in Aber-
deen and Glasgow, taking British Petroleum and Britoil to-
gether, would not fall as a result of the acquisition and that
British Petroleum would ensure that Britoil would not, except
in the ordinary course of trading, dispose of the whole or a
substantial part of its assets. In return for the undertakings,
the golden share would not be exercised and, after a period of
time, its redemption would be considered. Meanwhile, the
golden share would be the sanction behind the monitoring of
the undertakings, and would be transferred from the Treasury
to the Department of Energy. Just over 18 months later, after
a global review of its strategy, British Petroleum announced
plans to cut 970 jobs in Scotland and to sell £843 million of
assets to Oryx Energy, a United States oil company, as part of
a corporate reorganization.
The Energy Select Committee investigated these events
and issued a critical report.4" Although the Committee could
44. LAWSON, supra note 18, at 219.
45. See Richard Evans, Confusion in Water Industry, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 13,
1989, at 6; Paul Nettleton, Special Share Will Guard Water Groups, GUARDIAN,
Jan. 13, 1989, at 6.
46. Graham & Prosser, supra note 40, at 426-30.
47. See LAWSON, supra note 18, at 782.
48. HOUSE OF COMMONS, FIRST REPORT FROM THE ENERGY COMM., BP/BRISTOL
JOB LOSSES AND ASSET SALES, H.C. Doc NO. 13, 1989-90 SESS. (1989).
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identify no clear breach of the letter of assurances (which, it
remarked, was hardly surprising given the vagueness of many
important parts of them), it observed that British Petroleum's
new strategy was causing it to tread close to the bounds of
maneuverability which the assurances allowed the company.
The Committee criticized the obscurity of the assurances and
was particularly dissatisfied with the undefined duration of
many of them. As for the Department of Energy's role in moni-
toring the assurances, the Committee felt that the Department
did not place enough emphasis on British Petroleum's duty to
abide by them and was concerned by the Department's reliance
on information from British Petroleum for its monitoring. The
Committee felt that some independent monitoring by the De-
partment was necessary and recommended that the golden
share remain in existence for the time being. Despite this
recommendation, the government has now abandoned the
golden share in Britoil, making the announcement on a Friday
in the House of Commons, a day when most Scottish MPs are
not in Westminster.
The second type of golden share scheme has also caused
problems, although it was successfully used in the case of
Rolls-Royce to force the divestment of certain foreign
shareholdings. Problems have arisen here because the EC
Commission investigated its compatibility with Union law.
After protracted negotiations, the Department of Trade and
Industry agreed to raise the ceiling for British Aerospace and
Rolls-Royce to 29.5%, and the Commission undertook to review
this limit before the end of 1992 or sooner if non-UK investors
had difficulty in buying Rolls-Royce shares.49
Further difficulties have arisen over the government's role
in Ford's take-over of Jaguar. ° On privatization, Jaguar had
been given a golden share, limiting shareholdings to 15%,
which was due to expire at the end of 1990. Early in 1989, the
company entered into negotiations with General Motors hoping
that the American company would take a substantial minority
stake in return for investment in Jaguar. By the end of Octo-
ber 1989 the respective Boards had agreed a memorandum of
49. Brussels Accepts Plan for R-R, FIN. TIMES, July 20, 1989, at 1, 26.
50. For details of the events, see HOUSE OF COMMONS, DEPARTMENT OF TRADE
AND INDUSTRY, SPECIAL SHARES AND THE DTI, H.C. Doc. No. 90-i, 1989-90 SESS.
(1989).
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understanding, and the necessary legal documentation to pres-
ent the deal to the shareholders was being prepared. However,
Ford had also been interested in Jaguar since 1988 and had
built up a substantial minority stake. Ford then indicated to
the United States Securities and Exchange Commission, at the
end of October, that it would be prepared to make a full bid for
the British company if the restrictions on shareholding were
waived.
The day before the General Motors bid was due to be pre-
sented, the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry an-
nounced that the government would be prepared to waive the
15% restriction on shareholding if 75% percent of the share-
holders agreed. This was done without prior consultation of the
Jaguar board, which was given less than four hours notice;
indeed, it requested him not to make the announcement. No
explanation was given of why the Minister did not allow the
board to make its own decisions about the future of the compa-
ny. Although the Secretary of State denied having direct con-
tacts with Ford, it is clear that the Department was aware
that Ford was preparing a bid for Jaguar which was due immi-
nently.
As a result of the waiver, Jaguar's share price rose dra-
matically, General Motors refused to make a full bid, and,
after intensive negotiations, the Jaguar board recommended
Ford's bid, which was duly accepted by the shareholders, al-
though other parts of the special share remain in place.
Unsurprisingly, the bid was not referred to the MMC.
It was the failure to provide British Petroleum with a
golden share and the insistence that the sale of the
government's remaining shareholding take place, even in the
wake of the stock market crash, which provided the Kuwait
Investment Office (KIO) with a unique opportunity to purchase
a large stake in British Petroleum. In spite of informal at-
tempts to get the KIO to limit its shareholding, it was eventu-
ally built up to approximately 21%. The widely dispersed na-
ture of British Petroleum's -shareholding (the next largest
shareholder only had one-and-an-eighth percent of the shares)
raised worries about the level of Kuwait's influence. The gov-
erinent referred the shareholding to the MMC for a quick
report. While the MMC was investigating, the Kuwaitis offered
to enter into a deed with the United Kingdom Government,
giving certain assurances about their shareholding in British
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Petroleum. This offer was summarily declined.5
The MMC came to the conclusion that the shareholding
was contrary to the public interest because future conflicts of
interest between Kuwait, the United Kingdom, and British
Petroleum could be expected to arise. If that happened Kuwait
could be expected to use its shareholding to influence British
Petroleum's behavior. In particular, it might want to influence
British Petroleum's strategies in the product market, explora-
tion policies, future research and development and acquisitions
strategy. Difficulties could also arise regarding sensitive com-
mercial and political information if Kuwait could appoint a
director. Furthermore, adverse perceptions of British Petro-
leum could arise in third party countries.52
The MMC recommended that the KIO be required to di-
vest its shareholding in British Petroleum to no more than
9.9% within a period of 12 months. The Kuwaitis were report-
edly shocked by this move and, after representations to the
government, the period for divestiture was extended to three
years. Shortly after this announcement, British Petroleum
agreed to buy back 11.7% of the shares for £2.4 billion. A sub-
stantial proportion of the price accrued to Kuwait in the form
of advance corporation tax, which it was not liable to pay as a
sovereign government.
The important point about these three episodes is that
golden shares in privatized companies replaced the market for
corporate control with government discretion.53 It is tempting
to dismiss privatized industries as exceptional, as not like
other companies. To do so undermines the rhetoric of the pri-
vatization program, but there is a more serious objection. To
repeat a point made above, the takeover market is highly polit-
icized. The guidelines for referral and non-referral of bids to
the MMC are opaque and it is always possible that non-eco-
nomic criteria will be invoked. Therefore, to talk, in any simple
sense, of a market for corporate control is highly misleading.
51. For the details of the deed, see MONOPOLIES AND MERGERS COMMISSION,
THE GOVERNMENT OF KIAVAIT AND BRITISH PETROLEUM COMPANY PLC, 1988, CM
477, app. 7.1, at 99.
52. Id. 19 8.68, .73, .81, .90, .94, .98, .101, .118.
53. See STEPHEN C. LITTLECHILD, DEP'T OF ENVIRONMENT, ECONOMIC REGULA-
TION OF PRIVATISED WATER AUTHORITIES: A REPORT SUBMITTED TO THE DEPART-
MENT OF THE ENVIRONMENT N91 5.19-.23 (1986).
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Thus, if the economic aim was to introduce the privatized
industries to new market disciplines and new types of account-
ability, this part of the policy has had only limited success.
What about increasing the competition to which the monopoly
utilities are subject?
VI. INCREASING COMPETITION
In this section, I am concerned mainly with the four major
public utilities: electricity, gas, telecommunications and water.
As far as electricity and gas were concerned, there were at-
tempts to encourage competition prior to privatization in the
Oil and Gas (Enterprise) Act 1982 and the Energy Act 1983,
but neither of these measures were successful.54 Privatization
seemed to offer a perfect opportunity for liberalizing the com-
petitive structure of the industries concerned and there was no
shortage of advice on how to do this. In telecommunications,
there was liberalization in 1981 and, prior to privatization, the
government's economic adviser urged unrestricted resale of
voice telephony.55 In the gas sector, it was suggested that
British Gas be broken up into separate regional companies,"6
while there were numerous suggestions for making the elec-
tricity industry more competitive.57
In fact, none of these radical options was adopted and, in
general, the government was very cautious in introducing
competition. In telecommunications, BT was privatized intact,
and initially only one competitor, Mercury Communications,
was licensed. Simple resale of telephone services was not al-
lowed. British Gas was a more extreme example. The company
54. See VICKERS & YARROW, supra note 22, at 258, 290-94.
55. See MICHAEL E. BEESLEY, DEP'T OF INDUSTRY, LIBERALISATION OF THE USE
OF BRITISH TELECOMMUNICATIONS NETWORK TT 78-94 (1981).
56. See E.M. Hammond et al., British Gas: Options for Privatisation, 6 FISCAL
STUD. 1 (1985); Colin Robinson & Eileen Marshall, Regulation of the Gas Industry:
Memorandum 13 in HOUSE OF COMMONS, MEMORANDA SUBMITTED TO THE ENERGY
COMM., REGULATION OF THE GAS INDUSTRY, H.C. DOC. No. 15-i, 1985-86 SESS. 77
(1986). These options were apparently considered by the government and rejected.
See PETER E. WALKER, STAYING POWER 189 (1991).
57. See, e.g., ALEX HENNEY, PRIVATISE POWER: RESTRUCTURING THE ELECTRICI-
TY SUPPLY INDUSTRY (Centre for Policy Studies Policy Study No. 83, 1987); ALLEN
SYKES & COLIN ROBINSON, CURRENT CHOICES: GOOD WAYS AND BAD TO PRIVATISE
ELECTRICITY (Centre for Policy Studies Policy Study No. 87, 1987) and the list
contained in the House of Commons Report 307-i. H.C. DOC. NO. 307-i, supra note
7, 91 16.
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had a monopoly from the landing of gas on the beach to its
delivery to the ultimate consumer and it was simply privatized
as one entity. The provisions giving the regulator the duty to
promote competition in the industrial and commercial market
were not part of the original plans and were inserted as the
result of an amendment moved by a backbench Tory MP.
Given that blueprints for introducing greater competition
existed, and that the government ostensibly saw the introduc-
tion of greater competition as one of its economic objectives,
why were the industries not restructured? The general answer
to this question is a combination of pressures from the man-
agement of the companies and the difficulties of a successful
flotation. A successful privatization of a major utility in Britain
could not be accomplished without the cooperation of the senior
management. It is the management who had the information
about how the firm operated, not the relevant government
department. From the management's point of view, it makes
economic sense to retain as much monopoly power as possi-
ble.5" At the same time delay would not have suited the
government's political purposes, in part because it jeopardized
the income stream, the initial flotations were quite risky and
increasing the amount of competition in the industry could
have jeopardized their success.
In the area of competitive privatizations, the best example
of these pressures is British Airways. After the decision to
privatize was made, the government invited the Civil Aviation
Authority to report on the potential consequences for compe-
tition policy for the development of the British airline industry.
58. For accounts which stress the influence of management on preventing re-
structuring, see SWANN, supra note 20, at 260; VELiANOVSKI, supra note 22, at
118-19; VICKERS & YARROW, supra note 22, at 210-11; John A. Kay & David J.
Thompson, Privatisation: A Policy in Search of a Rationale, 96 ECON. J. 18, 29-30
(1986); David Marsh, Privatization under Mrs. Thatcher: A Review of the Litera-
ture, 69 PUB. ADMIN. 459, 467 (1991); Jeremy Moon et al., The Privatization of
British Telecom: A Case Study of the Extended Process of Legislation, 14 EUR. J.
POL. RES. 339, 351 (1986); Colin Robinson, Gas: What To Do After the MMC Ver-
dict, in REGULATING UTILITIES: THE WAY FORWARD 1, 5-6 (Michael E. Beesley ed.,
1994). Parkinson makes this point as regards electricity privatization. CECIL PAR-
KINSON, RIGHT AT THE CENTRE 257-80 (1992). On the BT privatization, see Doug-
las Pitt, An Essentially Contestable Organisation: British Telecom and the
Privatisation Debate in PRIVATISATION AND DEREGULATION IN CANADA AND BRITAIN
55 (J.J. Richardson ed., 1990); KARIN NEWMAN, THE SELLING OF BRITISH TELECOM
11-13 (1986).
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The Authority noted that British Airways would have a formi-
dable advantage over other British airlines when competing
with them, and was not optimistic that it could prevent abuse
of that power. It recommended a reduction in the relative size
of British Airways and the transfer of some routes away from
it to other airlines. These recommendations were significantly
watered down after powerful lobbying from British Airways. As
a result, British Airways absorbed the second largest UK carri-
er, British Caledonian, shortly after privatization, albeit under
conditions imposed as a result of a report by the MMC and the
European Commission.59
BT is also a good example. The sale of 51% of the shares
in November 1984 raised a total of £3.9 billion, six times larger
than any previous issue on the UK stock exchange.60 Given
that it was such a large flotation, that the sell-off was critical
to the government's financial needs and political aspirations
and that earlier privatizations had mixed results in terms of
flotation, it is not surprising that the government adopted a
cautious approach.6 The government had, in any event, gone
for a limited measure of competition and, as has been argued,
no one had studied the real problems of interconnection that
would have followed from a greater degree of break-up and
more competition, problems which are proving very difficult to
solve at the moment.62 In the privatization of British Gas not
even these minimal steps have been taken and most commen-
tators have been very critical of the decision to privatize Brit-
ish Gas intact:
The least satisfactory privatization was that of the British
Gas Corporation, where there was a Minister, Peter Walker,
whose heart was not in the policy, in combination with a
strong chairman, Sir Dennis Rooke, whose working-life had
59. See generally Robert Baldwin, Privatisation and Regulation: The Case of
British Airways in PRIVATISATION AND DEREGULATION IN CANADA AND BRITAIN,
supra note 58, at 93.
60. MATTHEW BISHOP & JOHN KAY, DOES PRIVATIZATION WORK? 4 (1988).
61. See Moon et al., supra note 58, at 350.
62. See C.D. FOSTER, PRIVATIZATION, PUBLIC OWNERSHIP AND THE REGULATION
OF NATURAL MONOPOLY 129 (1992). See also LAWSON, supra note 18, at 215-16.
On interconnection at the moment, see OFFICE OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS, INTER-
CONNECTION AND ACCOUNTING SEPARATION: THE NEXT STEPS (1994); Mercury Com-
munications Ltd. v. Director General of Telecommunications (H.L. Feb. 9, 1995)
(Eng.).
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been spent in the industry and was determined to keep it to-
gether.63
These criticisms seem to have had their effect in the next big
privatization, that of the electricity industry. Originally, the
government planned to break up a vertically integrated indus-
try into three parts: regional distribution companies, a grid
company (to be owned by the distribution companies) and two
main generating companies. Again the industry and its chair-
man resisted the break-up, but this time the government im-
posed the basic scheme. The criticism of the original plan was
that the distribution of assets between the two new generating
companies was to be on the basis of a 70/30 split. A split of
this size was said to be necessary because of the need to retain
the nuclear generating capacity in one company. The original
proposals were strongly criticized by the Energy Select Com-
mittee who thought that "the nuclear pre-occupations of the
Government have played a dominant part in its thinking, so
much so that the nuclear tail seems to be wagging the ESI
[Electricity Supply Industry] dog."' A major problem arose
when it became apparent that the private sector would not
invest in a company with substantial nuclear capability. As a
result, the nuclear power stations had to be withdrawn from
the sale and kept in the public sector. The result is that the
generating side of electricity is dominated by two firms: Na-
tional Power and PowerGen. There has been some evidence
that they can influence the price of electricity through their
own actions. In other words, they have a dominant position in
the market for electricity generation."
The instability of these regulatory arrangements can be
seen to an extent in gas and telecommunications. In gas, much
of the history of the industry since 1986 has been the history
63. FOSTER, supra note 62, at 130.
64. H.C. DOC. No. 307-i, supra note 7, % 41. See in particular the evidence of
the Secretary of State, Cecil Parkinson in the House of Commons Report 307-vi.
HOUSE OF COMMONS, ENERGY COmMITTEE, THE STRUCTURES, REGULATION AND
ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF ELECTRICITY SUPPLY IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR, H.C.
Doc. No. 307-vi, 1987-88 SESS. 376 (1988). For a general discussion, see JANE
ROBERTS ET AL., PRIVATISING ELECTRICITY: THE POLITICS OF POWER 98-119 (1991).
65. See HOUSE OF COMIIONS, ENERGY COMMITTEE, SECOND REPORT, CONSE-
QUENCE OF ELECTRICITY PRIVATISATION VOL. I, H.C. DOC NO. 113-I, 1991-1992
SESS. H 33-76 (1992).
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of attempts to introduce more competition into it, starting with
the industrial and commercial sector. This lead to a MMC
reference in 1988, intervention by the Office of Fair Trading
and a second MMC reference in 1992. The result has been an
agreement for a functional separation of British Gas into trad-
ing and distribution arms, plans for greater competition in
both domestic and industrial and commercial sectors and
greater powers for the regulator.66 At the moment, we are
waiting for a Gas Bill to be presented to Parliament this ses-
sion.
VII. REGULATION
The new regulatory bodies that were created on privatiza-
tion represented a substantial institutional innovation in Brit-
ish terms, as we have had no history of regulatory agencies,
unlike the US. Given this, we might have expected to find
substantial official discussion of the rationale behind regula-
tion and the merits of different approaches. In fact, there has
been remarkably little official discussion of regulation in rela-
tion to privatization in Britain. In the case of telecommunica-
tions, a brief White Paper emerged, but this simply repeated a
ministerial statement about the future of the industry with
less than a paragraph on the proposed regulatory arrange-
ments. With regards to gas, no White Paper or considered
consultative document was published. The White Paper on
electricity privatization dealt with the issue of regulation in
five paragraphs. The Energy Select Committee criticized this
as a "theoretical statement of intent" and "a misty outline"
rather than a fully worked out scheme.67 There was slightly
more discussion in relation to the regulation of the water in-
dustry, but this was largely due to the complexities of dividing
economic and quality regulation between two bodies.
The only substantial official discussion that has been pub-
lished are in Professor Littlechild's reports on the regulation of
BT's profitability" and the economic regulation of the water
authorities.69 These were narrowly focused on the question of
66. For a succinct summary, see Robinson, supra note 58, at 1-19.
67. H.C. Doc. No. 307-i, supra note 7, %9 60, 176.
68. See STEPHEN LITTLECHILD, DEP'T OF INDUSTRY, REGULATION OF BRITISH
TELECOMMUNICATIONS' PROFITABILITY (1984).
69. LITTLECHILD, supra note 53.
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what was the appropriate form of economic regulation. In his
discussion, Professor Littlechild was heavily influenced by his
perception of the US experience which he saw as having four
major defects: it encouraged regulatory capture, competition
was reduced due to regulation, there were poor incentives to
internal efficiency and the regulatory burden was heavy. The
answer was to provide a scheme which placed the minimum of
discretion in the hands of the regulator, thus protecting
against agency capture, providing a direct incentive for the
regulated company to increase its internal efficiency. As a re-
sult, he recommended the RPI - X price control scheme. The
basic idea underlying this scheme is that a regulated
company's prices cannot rise faster than the retail price index
minus a certain figure.
These reports do not cover a number of other regulatory
issues, such as the regulation of service quality and the insti-
tutional arrangements for regulation. If we look at the pub-
lished accounts of the development of the regulatory structure,
there seems to have been a great deal of improvisation in-
volved. This is certainly Foster's view"0 and his discussion of
how regulation was devised for BT is instructive. He says that
the idea of a license came from BT's duty to license other users
of its system, a duty inherited from the Post Office. It was a
small step to conclude that, if it entered the private sector, BT
would have to have a license and if BT were to be licensed, it
would be inequitable to allow it to license others. It was a po-
litical decision that BT should not be regulated by ministers.
The job was originally offered to the Director General of Fair
Trading, who decided that he had enough to do, so a specialist
look-alike was invented, the Director General of Telecommuni-
cations. Appeals, in some circumstances, were provided to the
MMC and there was an attempt to keep the courts out of regu-
latory affairs, apparently because of their poor perceived per-
formance in employer/employee relations! This structure then
became the general model for subsequent privatizations.
The same sort of improvisation can be seen in accounts of
the privatization of water.71 Here the original plan was to pri-
vatize the water industry intact, that is, to allow the water
70. FOSTER, supra note 62, at 125.
71. Moon et al., supra note 58, at 350-55.
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companies to continue with their regulatory functions. This
was opposed by numerous bodies outside the industry, includ-
ing the Confederation of British Industry, and it then became
apparent that the water companies would not be recognized as
"competent authorities" for the purposes of European Union
law. As a result, the government had to change its mind and
design a regulatory scheme which was based on separating
commercial activities from regulatory ones.
Before going any further, it is worth summarizing the
structure of regulation in Britain. The basic structure is simi-
lar across all four industries. The utility company is given a
license72 in the first instance by the Secretary of State. The
license contains terms and conditions that the utility is obliged
to follow. A regulatory office is also set up, at arms length from
the relevant government department, headed by a Director
General. The regulator's function is to make sure that the
license terms and conditions are followed and that they are
appropriate for current conditions. If the regulator wishes to
change the license this can be done by agreement or, failing
that, the regulator must make a reference to the MMC will
decide whether or not the regulator's proposal is in the public
interest. The balance of advantage thus lies with the utility.
Utilities do not, for example, have to seek prior approval of
their tariff structures as in the United States.
This looks to be a simple structure but there are three
additional points. First, government has set the initial compet-
itive environment for each industry, not the regulator. The
regulators must thus work within that environment. Second,
the government retains important reserve powers, such as the
power in some cases to approve references to the MMC. Third,
the regulators' jurisdiction is divided in important ways. This
is most noticeable in the water industry where economic regu-
lation is the responsibility of the Office of Water Services,
quality regulation is the responsibility of the National Rivers
Authority and Her Majesty's Inspectors of Pollution and quali-
ty standards are set by the European Union and implemented
by the Secretary of State. The economics of the industry are
currently driven by the need to meet the quality standards.
72. The terminology used varies for no apparent reason. "License" is used for
electricity and telecommunications; "authorization" for gas; and "appointment" for
water. "License" will be used to encompass all these terms.
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This is the basic structure. What are the regulators' legal
duties? The regulators say that they are there to protect the
consumer."3 However, this is an interpretation of their legal
duties. Regulators have two primary legal duties. First, to
ensure that all reasonable demands for the product are satis-
fied, or, in the case of water, that water companies carry out
their activities "properly". Second, that companies are able to
finance the carrying out of their activities. Subject to these
duties, they have a duty to promote the interests of consumers,
as well as having duties to protect the interests of the elderly
and disabled.'4 The position was nicely summarized by David
Walker: "The new regulatory offices are not consumer
watchdogs or rather, if they are, they are queer canines whose
first priority appears to be engaging in deeply meaningful
dialogues with the burglar about his financial circumstanc-
es. 75
This structure essentially creates a new separation of
powers. Commercial and regulatory activities are clearly sepa-
rated. Day to day regulatory activities are separated from
matters of more general political or strategic importance, al-
though this latter separation is not at all clear, but this is the
most favorable interpretation of it. There is no doubt that this
has been an improvement over the regulatory structures that
existed pre-privatization. The licenses provide a clear state-
ment of the duties and responsibilities of the industries, the
regulatory agencies are better equipped to police these licenses
than the departments were and more information about the
working of the industries reaches the public domain than be-
fore.
There has also been a fierce debate about the effectiveness
of these regulatory institutions, a debate that shows no signs
of disappearing. There seem to be four major criticisms. First,
the regulators have too much discretion. Second, the legislation
73. See, e.g., HOUSE OF COMMONS, COMM. OF PUBLIC ACCOUNTS, THE OFFICE
OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS: LICENSE COMPLIANCE AND CONSUMER PROTECTION, H.C.
DOC. No. 707-i, 1992-93 SESS. (1993) (Director General of Telecommunications'
response to the Public Accounts Committee).
74. See Water Industry Act, 1991, ch. 56, § 2(4) (Eng.); Electricity Act, 1989,
ch. 29, §§ 3(4)-(5) (Eng.); Telecommunications Act, 1984, ch. 12 (Eng.); Gas Act,
1965, ch. 36, § 4(3) (Eng.).
75. David Walker, Enter the Regulators, 43 PARLIAMENTARY AFF. 149, 156
(1990).
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has conflicting objectives and, by formally vesting all the pow-
ers in one person, this leads to personalized regulation. Third,
there is structural confusion because some industries, such as
energy, are divided between two regulators. Fourth, the regula-
tors have changed the rules of the game in a way that was not
envisaged at the time of privatization.76 I do not have the
space to rebut these allegations, but there are substantial
defenders of the present system who call for incremental, rath-
er than revolutionary change."
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
What conclusions can be drawn from the British privatiza-
tion program? First, it represents the failure of legal ordering
in Britain as a polity. The major influences have been prag-
matic political ones, and there has been little attempt to think
about the process in more principled terms. If you want to find
a guiding thread to the program, the idea of party political
advantage offers as good an explanation as any, as argued by
Dobek recently.7"
There are also a number of more interesting lessons. One
is that the process of privatization, with its creation of new
institutional structures, alters the policy process in important
ways. New groups enter into it, such as the regulators, while
other groups are excluded, such as the public sector trade
unions. It is impossible to predict what policy changes will
emerge from this new arrangement of forces, as matters will
develop a momentum of their own. This needs to be seen in the
context of the liberalization of markets, which usually accom-
panies privatization, even if in an attenuated form, and chang-
es brought about by technology, seen most obviously in tele-
76. -See generally PETER HAIN, REGULATING FOR THE COMMON GOOD (1994);
CENTO VELIJANOvSKI, THE FUTURE OF INDUSTRY REGULATION IN THE UK A REPORT
OF AN INDEPENDENT INQUIRY (1993); Dieter Helm, Rewrite the Rules for Regula-
tion, FIN. TIMES, April 7, 1993, at 19.
77. See, e.g., FOSTER, supra note 62; Sir Bryan Carsberg, Reflections on the
Regulation of Privatised Companies (unpublished manuscript, on file with the
Brooklyn Journal of International Law). See also Sir Christopher Foster, Natural
Monopoly Regulation: Is Change Required? (Sept. 14, 1994) (paper given at the
Centre for the Study of Regulated Industries Academic Forum, on file with the
author); Sir Christopher Foster, Who or What Regulates the Regulators? (Apr. 19,
1994) (paper given at Conference at the University of Hull, on file with the Brook-
lyn Journal of International Law).
78. Dobek, supra note 13, at 40.
210 [Vol. MXI
PRIVATIZATION IN THE U.K
communications but also relevant in the energy industries.
When these factors have been put together in a British con-
text, privatization has developed a momentum of its own, to-
ward greater liberalization and competition. The genie of com-
petition and markets cannot be prevented from escaping and,
once it is released, it will not go back in the box. This does not
mean that pure market forces reign supreme. The lesson from
Britain is that market structures are created by governmental
decision and competition is planned, although planning is an
inaccurate description of decision making processes in Britain.
Nor does the increase in competition mean that regulation will
wither away, like the Leninist state. The experience to date
suggests that a need for regulation will remain, although the
terms and conditions may change. This points to a fundamen-
tal truth, that government cannot disengage from strategic
markets.7" It will always have some responsibility for deci-
sions taken or not taken. One of the things that is important is
the institutional structure within which that decision takes
place and I think that is one of the major contributions of the
British privatization program. Despite its improvised nature,
the regulatory structure devised has allowed us to address
fundamental questions about the operation of the utilities in
Britain. Insofar as a need is seen to reinvent government, then
this has been a positive first step.
79. Also drawing the same conclusion is Colin Scott, Privatization, Control,
and Accountability, in CORPORATE CONTROL AND ACCOUNTABILITY 231 (Joseph
McCahery et al. eds., 1993). See also Dieter Helm, Energy Policy and Market Doc-
trine, 64 POL. Q. 410 (1993).
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